Immanuel Kant's concept of dignity: A philosophical ground and a case for considering human dignity as the highest constitutional value
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.58298/2021160Keywords:
Human Dignity, categorical imperative, instrumentalization, German Basic LawAbstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze and highlight the philosophical conceptualization of human dignity by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant and how his reflections in this regard can provide a compelling theoretical ground and an underpinning for recognizing and elevating human dignity to the pinnacle of constitutional values. Kant is one of the foremost thinkers of the Age of Enlightenment and the most prominent figure in the world of moral and legal philosophy. Many of his ideas are directly related to the concept of human dignity, Kant become one of the most frequently cited philosophers who analyzed the philosophical and ethical dimensions of human dignity. His ideas in this regard had a great impact on establishing human dignity as the highest constitutional value, especially in the German Basic Law 1949, which considers human dignity as a non-derogated value, which means that the human being is an end in itself and not a means to achieve the goals and objectives of others, including the state. Consequently, there is no justification for violating or diminishing human dignity by the state. On the contrary, the goal of the state’s existence is to promote and respect human dignity, and this is a duty incumbent upon all state authorities, executive, legislative and judicial.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution (CC BY) 4.0 international license which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium or format, and to alter, transform, or build upon the material, including for commercial use, providing the original author is credited.